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WORKING PAPER

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29 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: Proposal for Upgrading and Vitalizing the
Government's Human Sources Organization

1. For more than six months I have been an observer and participant in your indefatigable effort to mold the USIB Human Sources Committee into an instrument that will carry out the human source collection and reporting missions that have been so well defined by the DCI, the PFIAB, the Rockefeller Commission Report, the Murphy Commission Report, and particularly by Senator Mansfield's supplement in the Murphy Report. All these reports, beginning with the excellent characterization of the subject and recommendations by the PFIAB in its 1973 report, are unanimous in finding that information collection, processing, dissemination and production from the human resources available to the national government is inadequate. The structure is in disarray.

2. In all of these findings of inadequacy, there is a uniform failure to identify the key element which contributes to the disarray. This failure may arise out of narrow bureaucratic motivations of the individual agencies. We in the Intelligence Community, however, who have concerned ourselves with the search for solutions to these national-level problems in the past year have had no difficulty in identifying and articulating this element:

The Intelligence Community and the elements of those agencies that are considered to comprise that Community are not the potential, or actual primary producers of human source collection and reporting.

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The bulk of the national government's information collection and production is performed by non-intelligence agencies. These traditional old-line departments (such as Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, State) (the State INR element is considered part of the Intelligence Community, but State itself does not regard itself as such) do not consider themselves part of the Intelligence Community and they culturally do not approve any activity that they consider risking their contamination with intelligence and particularly CIA. This cultural attitude cannot be overemphasized in its impact on government human source information collection and reporting. To these agencies CIA is the "dirty tricks" organization and this element outweighs and over-shadows the fact that the bulk of CIA's work is the same kind of overt collection, research, and analysis which the older-line agencies have been performing, often in antiquated fashion, for generations.

3. To achieve effective national human source cohesion and for information collection and production, these crippling cultural and organizational impediments must be removed. The presently designated Intelligence Community and non-intelligence agencies must be unified in their information gathering and reporting activity.

4. The creation of USIB's Human Sources Committee was a proper first step in the direction toward which the PFIAB HUMINT report and related guidance pointed. The progress that you have made with this Committee, particularly with the FOCUS exercise, has so far been commendable. Regretfully, however, it has been your personal effort and not the institution itself that has achieved this progress. Your personal efforts and the cooperation you generated from the National Intelligence Officers and others has accounted for this progress. The main benefits of the FOCUS exercises,

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and related exercises, have been largely indirect in bringing analysts together and in facilitating awareness by Ambassadors of their overt information reporting responsibilities. Other Human Sources Committee action plan items are noble in their purpose but dependent for execution on the goodwill of the individual agencies.

5. Within recent weeks, the Senate Select Committee Staff has seized upon the Human Sources Committee (perhaps because of presumed analogies with the SIGINT and COMIREX organizations) as the key mechanism for the national management of the government's human sources. The Senate Select Committee Staff's investigations began with oral debriefings of employees concerned with the human source requirements process. Unfortunately, some of the interviewees were not collection managers and did not understand the process for levying of requirements for human source collection, nor the subsequent operational phases. In addition to requirements generation factor per se, the Senate Select Committee investigators zeroed in on the manner in which human source requirements drive the allocation of human resources. Having now completed their oral debriefings of these topics, the Senate Select Committee investigators have submitted a request for a written exposition of DCI and Community management and direction of human source requirement generation and resource allocation.

6. As you know, [] of MPRRD has been preparing the response to the Senate Select Committee on this topic and I have provided oral and written material to assist in this task. It emerges clearly that the Senate Select Committee Staff has identified the Human Sources Committee, not suprisingly, as the only central organ in the government responsible for management of human sources.

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Equally, unsurprisingly, the Committee Staff is finding that the Human Sources Committee work is inadequate in two primary areas of concern:

Requirements

Allocation of resources.

It may thus be expected that the Senate Select Committee Staff will conclude that this aspect of the government's management of human sources is inadequate--a conclusion that we, PFIAB, the Murphy Commission, and all others concerned with this at the national level have long known. At the same time, however, my impression is that the Senate Select Committee staffers are finding that the Human Sources Committee concept is new, has not had time to be fully effective, is cognizant of its responsibilities, and is making slow progress. But I believe the conclusion will be drawn, correctly in my view, that satisfactory long-term progress cannot be made with the present or any similar organization.

7. As you and I have recently discussed in some detail, the Human Sources Committee as presently constituted (your energetic leadership, patience, cajoling, and superb persuasive efforts notwithstanding) is making inadequate progress--with certain exceptions such as FOCUS, the secondary fall-out from that effort, and on some of the other action items in the program. The Human Sources Committee and its method of operation, i.e., via sub-committees manned by participating agencies is an inadequate method for accomplishing the action program tasks. The main reason for this is:

There is no adequate mechanism for executive management of the actions and policies decided by the Committee.

One of the main reasons for inadequate management follow-up is the weak membership on the Committee. The Committee members are mostly third echelon representatives of their principals. It has frankly been dismaying to me to watch you, a senior government official, preside over Human Sources Committee meetings eloquently and patiently pleading, explaining, urging, and persuading Committee members to get on with various programs when the junior persons you are addressing often neither understand the import of the major questions you are addressing nor have the stature or articulateness to convey to their principals what your leadership is promoting. There is a more serious aspect to this problem: At the risk of being considered cynical, I submit that some of these same Human Sources Committee members, who probably do in various forms report to their principals, also perform for their principals a service as "screeners" whose purpose is in part to keep Human Sources Committee activity away from the parent agency so that it can go about its own affairs as it sees fit with minimum Human Sources Committee interference.

8. The lack of seriousness by participating Human Sources Committee agencies is no more clearly illustrated than in the case of the Department of State whose representative has no experience in embassies or diplomatic missions abroad and who has never even met his principal, the Director of INR, which provides State's Human Sources Committee member. While the State example may be extreme, some of the other agencies conduct their Human Sources Committee representation in a similar vein.

9. Two principal factors work against Human Sources Committee effectiveness:

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a. The mediocre members supplied by the agencies and the lack of seriousness by both members and agencies.

b. The fact that major government information gathering and reporting agencies are not represented in the Human Sources Committee.

Several measures are needed to make national government human source collection effective. The above two considerations are starting points, but a key organizational aspect must be reemphasized.

10. That key organizational aspect is the fact that the major foreign information gathering and reporting organizational entity of the national government is the embassy/diplomatic mission abroad, which in nearly every instance is headed by an Ambassador. Embassies consist of elements representing national agencies, many of which are not intelligence agencies, are not represented in USIB or any of its subordinate organizations, and yet are major foreign information reporters.

11. Even agencies such as State and Defense, elements of which are technically represented in USIB at the national level, have major bureaus and components which collect and report information but which are not in fact effectively represented in or responsive to USIB initiated guidance. Examples: The Political and Economic Sections of the Foreign Service (which are not directly or adequately represented in USIB or the Human Sources Committee by INR), and the MAAG missions and Defense Security Assistance missions of the Defense Department, which also are not represented by DOD membership on USIB and subordinate groups. The Murphy Commission Report stresses that reporting by the Foreign

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Service is inadequate, particularly in that which the Commission calls Foreign Assessment Reporting (field reporting and analysis) is not being adequately performed.^{1/} The Murphy Commission Report goes on to note that many of the other agencies of the government, which it calls the "domestic" agencies, such as Agriculture, Treasury and others, have international affairs activity and representations at embassies abroad which do extensive foreign collection and reporting. The PFIAB Human Sources Report eloquently and precisely identifies these same elements. Each embassy and diplomatic mission abroad is a conglomerate of the national-level agencies, of which only a few are elements of intelligence organizations per se, and thus responsive directly to national-level intelligence community management and direction. The Ambassador, on the other hand, who is the representative of the President and by statute and executive order is responsible for the management of the embassy's extensive overt information gathering and reporting capability is, on the whole, ill-equipped to perform this function. The State Department itself is neither organized nor culturally inclined to supply the Ambassador with what he needs to fulfill this complex role. INR, which might be deemed to have the technical responsibility to provide such staff support, has never done so, is not equipped to do so now, and its management has consistently been reluctant to become active in this regard. In fact, INR's attitudes in participation in the Human Sources Committee have indicated the syndrome of the "screener" described in paragraph 7 above. The Ambassador's overt collection coordination responsibilities must be enhanced (with due special consideration for DDO aspects) and he needs the necessary support.

^{1/} Indeed "what we are suggesting is, firstly, that this responsibility has become the most important single function of the U.S. Embassies abroad" (page 118,

12. Based on experience with the Human Sources Committee and comparing that experience with that of the SIGINT and the COMIREX Committees, it is difficult not to conclude that a Committee such as the Human Sources Committee cannot manage, from the requirements or allocation of resources points of view, a human sources structure as complex and disparate as that in our national government. Such a Committee, particularly as it has been constituted to date, cannot depend upon its constituent agencies to carry out cohesively and effectively the policies and actions that the Committee determines. There are specific actions which need to be taken to structure a mechanism that is responsive to the President's desires, the DCI's responsibilities, the injunctions of the PFIAB, the Murphy Commission findings, Senator Mansfield's comments ^{2/}, and the findings of other authorities who have addressed these questions. The following considerations are pertinent to action recommendations:

a. The management of the government's human resources, being both intelligence and non-intelligence in nature, is more complex than the management of the SIGINT and Imagery Intelligence programs. Yet it is noted that both of the latter programs have large management staffs.

b. Committees cannot manage without executive arms. Committees are useful for the formulation of policy but not for its execution and management.

^{2/} Senator Mansfield (p. 232 of Murphy Commission Report):
My belief is that the CIA, with all its blemishes, remains at the heart of our intelligence operations... I agree that the DCI should be given enhanced control over coordinating intelligence and should have fullest access to the President.

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c. Because the overseas embassy and diplomatic mission houses a variety of national agency representatives, it is vital that the linkage between the Washington level management of the individual organizations represented at the embassy and the embassy's local collection and reporting management by the Ambassador be structured in such a way that there is immediate and continuing responsive collective and individual linkage. During the past couple of years, I have had extensive discussions with Foreign Service Officers from the junior to the senior level on information gathering and reporting management at embassies, not only with regard to the Political and Economic Sections reporting but on the entire spectrum of agency representations at embassies.

In no case (and I estimate that I have discussed this with representatives of at least 35 different embassies) has any senior officer said that there is any concerted effort at central management of information gathering and reporting at any embassy. At the same time (specifically at a recent Deputy Chiefs of Mission Seminar at which I reviewed this subject at length), there appears to be unanimous recognition that the Ambassador's responsibility as the coordinator of overt collection and reporting by all agencies represented at his embassy is a necessary function which is rarely carried out because there is no assistance to the Ambassador in the form of doctrine or other support.

d. A sub-element of this embassy collection and reporting management problem is the increasing importance of economic intelligence collection and reporting management. This substantive area is being attacked piece-meal and disjointedly. It must be made a part of the total human source collection and reporting process at embassies.

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13. Based upon the above considerations, I make the following recommendations for a revamping of the Human Sources Committee to accomplish the job which the national level government requires:

a. The Human Sources Committee as presently constituted should be abolished and a new body should be formed. The new body must be a policy making body. It should not bear the unfortunate label of intelligence. The membership of this body must be upgraded. The DOD representative, for example, should be General Crittenberger, the Department of State representative should at a minimum be Ambassador Kirk. Preferably the State representative should not be from INR but from Undersecretary Sisco's office. Similarly, representations from the other agencies must be upgraded to general or equivalent officer rank.

b. The Committee should be renamed the "Foreign Information Coordination Council."

The Council would set policy in the human sources information gathering and reporting field.

c. The Council should be expanded to include membership by all agencies of the national government which have national-level information gathering and reporting responsibility and representatives located at overseas embassies and diplomatic missions. This involves an extensive expansion of the Council and should include Commerce, AID, USIA, Agriculture (Foreign Agricultural Service), Defense Assistance Security Agency (and other Defense agencies with reporting potential), Department of

Labor (Labor Attaches), ERDA, NASA, and other scientific and technical agencies which have representation abroad.

d. As a policy body, the Council should meet no more than once a month. Its policy deliberations should include general action programs such as previously considered by the Human Sources Committee, but particularly a centralized information gathering and reporting management plan based on the National HUMINT Plan presently being prepared. (I am searching for another name for the National HUMINT Plan to eliminate the word HUMINT and to replace it with a word that is more compatible with the interests and cultures of the non-intelligence agencies.) The Council would set requirements and resource allocation policy (with IRAC coordination) and the management group (see below) would translate this policy with specific resource allocations on an interagency consultation basis. Both Council and Management Group must have requirements and resource allocation functions.

e. The executive arm of the Council would be a management group, a merger of the Executive Secretariat with the DCI's Intelligence Community Staff Human Sources component. This arrangement is already working well under the auspices of the Human Sources Committee and would require moderate adjustment.. I am attaching, to refresh your memory, a document which was recently prepared on staffing requirements for the present Human Sources Committee. The management/executive arm will be responsible at the technical level to stimulate the individual agencies to carry out actions

in furtherance of the policy decisions of the Council.
For such a management group to be effective, we will
need to augment our staff. That is the reason I
desire to acquire the services of [] and
one or two Foreign Service Officers in addition to

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[] who is scheduled to report for duty
on 15 September. This interagency executive manage-
ment group would become the action agent for the
human sources council and would in effect be combined
with the Council's Secretariat as one organization.

In addition to [] and the possible
addition of the Foreign Service Officers, I would
urge the assignment to this management group also of

[] to provide the necessary interface
with the economic intelligence community and the
management activity that needs to be carried out
with Ambassadors and embassies on behalf of the
Council in the economic area.

14. There are bureaucratic and practical difficulties
in the implementation of this plan. The chief opposition
will arise from the Department of State which will consider
that its prerogatives in managing embassy information
gathering and reporting are being usurped. In fact State
long ago abdicated this responsibility and has no structure
to manage such an effort. The President's chief intelligence
officer, the DCI, ought to be the manager of this effort
and I believe that potential State objections can be overcome
with State's participation on the Council and at every level
and stage of implementation of these activities. This
includes State's participation in the interagency management
group in the Intelligence Community Staff and on the
Secretariat. Based on my extensive discussions with FSO's,

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State does not have a substantive leg to stand on and I believe that we can make this case if we tool up properly.

15. To launch this program, we make a three-prong attack:

a. A "progress report" and reorganization proposal to USIB by you as Chairman of the Human Sources Committee on the basis of more than six-months experience, drawing upon the contents of this memorandum, as well as your own experience. A point paper or any other material you need for this purpose can, of course, be prepared.

b. A briefing of PFIAB. PFIAB needs to know that its 1973 recommendations have not been carried out primarily because of the lack of cooperation on the part of the Department of State and the other non-intelligence agencies. This proposed solution should be presented to PFIAB (with any modification that we may devise) so that it has opportunity for an input. I am prepared

25X1 to sound out [] (a DDO colleague whom I have known for years) on this and I am also prepared to sound out Gordon Gray on an informal basis. I have known Gray for some years and have dealt with him in the past on clandestine HUMINT matters. I believe the PFIAB approach should be kept on this or similar informal basis rather than having the DCI take a more formal testing of the water.

c. The National HUMINT Plan (hopefully with changed name) should incorporate the basic outlines of this proposal with emphasis placed

on acceptance of requirements for gathering information and reporting by all intelligence and non-intelligence agencies. I have reviewed this with [] and he is incorporating these elements into the draft outline which is now just about complete.

16. To carry out this program, we need to augment the Intelligence Community Staff HUMINT component. In addition, we should revise the Human Sources Committee Action Program more in keeping with an articulation of broader policy questions. The specifics should then be articulated by the IC/Secretariat Management Group for early execution. Among the pressing priorities are the work we need to do with the Foreign Service Institute to begin training of human source collectors in the Foreign Service, USIA, AID, and related agencies. In addition to augmentation of the IC HUMINT group and the Executive Secretariat, I strongly recommend appointment of a Vice-Chairman of the new Council. I believe you should continue as the Chairman of the new and augmented Council, even though ultimately replaced by an Ambassador, an arrangement I still believe is the best one for the long run. I believe that a Vice-Chairman could devote the necessary effort in tandem with you to achieve faster overall progress and to promote a better synergistic action between the policy council and executive management group actions.

17. I am prepared to present an oral briefing in explanation and elaboration of the above points and would be grateful for the opportunity to do so. Pending reactions to the proposals herein, I suggest we defer finalizing the new Human Sources Committee Chairman Letter of Instruction.

[]
C/HB/ICS

Attachments:

A, B and C

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29 August 1975

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

Dear Mr. Vice President:

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1973 conducted an examination of the human resources information gathering and reporting activities of national government agencies. The Board recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence undertake to improve the management of information gathering and utilization by national government agencies as a whole. I understand he has implemented some measures in this direction.

In June 1975 the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy made additional findings and recommendations concerning the need for improvement in the reporting of foreign information from our embassies abroad to the national government in Washington.

Recommendations of the June 1975 Commission Report included:

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--"The most important modification needed in embassy responsibilities is to bring a far greater emphasis on the analysis of probable host country responses to emerging issues of concern to the U.S, a function we term 'foreign assessment.'"

--The Commission also stressed the President's responsibilities for the effective performance of foreign affairs agencies other than the State Department and that the increasing importance of other foreign affairs and "domestic" agencies in this arena should be recognized. I believe that this concern includes the gathering and prompt reporting of accurate information to the national level of the government by representatives of all agencies abroad.

--The Commission further noted that the so-called "domestic" agencies have entered the world of international relations in a large way. Most of these agencies, it further noted, carry out extensive contacts with foreign governments. In the course of these contacts and activities, I believe the gathering and reporting of information needed by the national government must and should be a paramount factor. Our government must be second to none in receiving the knowledge it needs to conduct its

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foreign affairs.

In recent years the gathering and reporting of international economic information has become particularly important, with overlapping responsibilities and participation by several federal government agencies being of critical importance. These agencies include the Department of Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of State. Their effective cooperation in information gathering and reporting must be assured.

As the national government has seen the need for massive increases in information from its personnel stationed abroad, it has also recognized the important role of the Ambassador at the overseas level as manager for the gathering and reporting of this information. This responsibility of the Ambassador was recently reaffirmed by Congress in Public Law 93-475. I see a growing need for centralized management, beginning at the national level and extending ultimately to the Ambassadorial level, for more effective information gathering management and reporting by all agencies in all aspects of foreign concern.

At the national level, the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent National Security Directives have placed upon the Director of Central Intelligence major

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responsibility for the coordination, analysis, and production of information collected and needed by national government agencies. The growing number of agencies which collect and produce information from their human resources abroad prompts me to request a management examination of the human resource information gathering and reporting procedures and activity of all agencies which perform such functions.

Accordingly, Mr. Vice President, I request that you undertake, in close consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Security Council, a study for the purpose of recommending to me appropriate organizational proposals which will insure that the information gathering, reporting and production activities of federal government agency human resources are centrally, expeditiously, and effectively directed. I would appreciate a report on this topic no later than January 1, 1976.


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National Human Resource Reporting Organization

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FOREIGN REPORTING COORDINATION COUNCIL: FORMULATES COLLECTION AND REPORTING MANAGEMENT POLICY

COUNCIL MANAGEMENT STAFF: BASED ON COUNCIL POLICY; PROVIDES TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE FOR AMBASSADOR TO MANAGE MISSION ELEMENTS COLLECTION AND REPORTING

DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: TASK AND DIRECT FIELD ELEMENTS DIRECTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH COUNCIL POLICY AND AMBASSADORIAL DIRECTION

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
Support Structure for the Human Sources Committee

Summary. This proposes a permanent staffing arrangement for the Human Sources Committee of USIB. The new Chairman would be a full-time employee or be supported by a Deputy Chairman. A permanent Secretariat should be established. A minimum Secretariat staff would consist of seven professionals, one or two assistants, and at least two clericals. Most of the professionals would be detailed to the Secretariat on 2-3 year rotational assignments from elements of CIA and from other Agencies.

Background. Currently there are no full-time people working for the HSC. General Wilson serves as Chairman in addition to his more than full-time job as Director of the Intelligence Community Staff. The Executive Secretary [redacted] serves at the same time as the Deputy Chief of the Human Sources Group of the Collection Guidance and Assessments Staff, DDI. Secretariat support is provided by that Group. Four professionals from CGAS/HSG (in addition to [redacted]) provide support on a time-available basis; the HSC-sponsored CIRL is also produced in the Group; one senior secretary spends most of her time on Committee matters. (Given an increase in competing demands, the continuation of the existing high level of HSC support is problematical.) Acting Chairman Wilson also receives assistance on HSC and other Humint matters from two professionals in the IC Staff/Humint Branch.

Changing Circumstances. The HSC became a permanent USIB committee in the summer of 1974. Since that time, and especially since the selection of General Wilson as Acting Chairman, the Committee has become increasingly busy (and hopefully productive). An Action Program for Calendar Year 1975 was adopted; it consists of five major Objectives and several dozen Tasks. Certain of these Tasks are of considerable magnitude (e.g., Project FOCUS, the development of a National Humint Plan, the Humint R&D Program, the role of the HSC in the KIQ strategy and KIQ evaluation programs). Additional Tasks are being proposed weekly, and the HSC has become one of the most active of the USIB committees.

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The activity of the HSC exceeds the handling capacities of the current part-time mechanisms. This is the opinion of General Wilson and of the State, CIA, and DIA Members of the Executive Steering Group. Though the Secretariat and the Humint Branch of the IC Staff work long and hard, important Committee tasks are being deferred because of the lack of personnel to do the necessary work. And at this point in the history of the Intelligence Community, it is especially important that the DCI be given all appropriate advice and assistance by the HSC "in the discharge of his responsibilities for the efficient allocation and effective use of community resources for the collection of positive foreign intelligence information through human sources."

Organizational Options. Presumably, the Chairman will occupy a slot provided by the Intelligence Community Staff. The Secretariat could be placed either in the IC Staff or remain located in the DDI (a la COMIREX). Placement in the IC Staff would clarify any ambiguities regarding the supervision of the Secretariat. On the other hand, the DDI option allows the Office of the Chairman to draw upon additional Intelligence Directorate resources; emphasizes the DDI role in support of the Director as head of the Intelligence Community; and such dispersion disguises the magnitude of Intelligence Community-related support. The DDI option probably is available only if almost all additional Secretariat slots are provided from outside the Directorate. If the Secretariat is maintained in the Intelligence Directorate, it should be at least a quasi-independent unit, organizationally separate, but cooperating, with CGAS/HSG.

Assumptions. The need for permanent Secretariat staffing is based upon assumptions such as the following:

- A. A National Humint Plan is prepared and updated annually.
- B. There is an increased Committee role in the development of KIQ Strategy Reports and a developing role re KEP.
- C. FOCUS continues with increased staff support.

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D. A R&D concern continues as does concern with training and orientation.

E. Some sort of human sources inventory is developed and maintained in conjunction with CIRIS.

F. Guidance activities continue, to include interagency airgrams, official/informal letters, Skylink calls, selected manuals, and the CIRL or some follow-up vehicle.

G. Resource studies are conducted for consideration by IRAC and other users.

H. Concern regarding relationships with other Committees receives increasing attention (and committees such as IDC may be subsumed under the HSC).

I. Some standing HSC substructure is established within the next year (e.g., a Guidance Subcommittee, a Subcommittee on Humint R&D).

Slotting Needs. See attached.

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Proposed HSC Staff

Chairman GS-18 or equivalent
(If there is not a full time Chairman, there should be a Vice Chairman.)

Executive Secretary GS-15/16
--runs the day-to-day business of the Office of the Chairman
--serves as Chairman, Executive Steering Group, which has certain planning and review responsibilities
--monitors for the Chairman the diverse activities of HSC task groups, project leaders, etc.
--advises the Chairman on Committee matters

Professionals

- * GS-14/15: Deputy Executive Secretary, Guidance Coordinator (Skylark, manuals, inter-agency letters, cables, requirements, briefings, etc.)
- * GS-14 Assessments Coordinator (Project FOCUS, special assessments, projects)
- * GS 13/14 Planning Officer (National Humint Plan, KIQ Strategies)
- * GS-13/14 R&D and Training Officer (R&D task team/subcommittee; concerned with adequacy of training for collectors; special projects)
- * GS-13/14 Guidance/Assessments Officer (also liaison with overt collectors)
- * GS-12/13 Guidance/Assessments Officer (also liaison with non-overt collectors)

Assistants

- * GS-10/12 Inventory Control Officer (maintains machine record of size, location, function, cost of human source collection/reporting elements)

Clericals

- * GS-09 Secretary to Chairman
- * GS-07/08 Secretary
- * GS-05 Clerk

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Detailees

Suggest that professionals be acquired on detail (with slots provided from contributing component). Detailees could be two DDI (possibly one from FBIS), one DDS&T, one DDO, two DOD, one State.